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PROBLEMS IN DEFINING THE INSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE
PRESS
This comment will deal with the concept of freedom of the press within
the context of recent Supreme Court rulings which have directly or indi-
rectly involved definitions of the role of the organized press in the govern-
mental framework established by the Constitution. Specifically, the focus
will be in the areas of the law dealing with defamation, testimonial privi-
lege and the fair trial-free press controversy. The purpose will be to discern
whether the Supreme Court is developing a concept of freedom of the press
which is distinguishable from the general guarantee of freedom of speech
and which derives its rationale from the recognition of the special institu-
tional function of the press in a democratic society. The conclusion will
summarize the results of this analysis, point out tendencies to limit the
recognition of institutional press rights and discuss a theory upon which
to base the recognition of a differentiated guarantee of freedom of the
press.
I. INTRODUCTION: RECOGNIZING THE ROLE OF THE PRESS
Concurring in Whitney v. California,' Mr. Justice Brandeis elegantly
described the reasons compelling constitutional protection of free speech.'
The description enunciated, essentially, three basic justifications for free-
dom of speech. First, without free speech there can be no democratic
dialogue, the open exchange of ideas necessary to the education and en-
lightenment of a self-governing people. Second, freedom of expression is a
means for self-fulfillment and, as such, is an end in itself. Third, freedom
of speech is a stabilizing factor, a safety valve providing a means for the
1. 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927).
2. Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make
men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative
forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a
means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness. . . . They believed that
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discus-
sion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection
against the dissemination of noxious doctrine, that the greatest menace to freedom is
an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a
fundamental principle of the American government. They recognized the risks to
which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured
merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage
thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds
hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the oppor-
tunity to discuss supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting
remedy for evil counsels is good ones.
Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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peaceful venting of discontent.' The first and third justifications directly
serve governmental purposes. The second recognizes that individual self-
fulfillment which results from freedom of expression is a special benefit of
liberty and should be protected.
However, -the first amendment states that Congress shall make no law
abridging freedom of speech, or of the press,' and the question raised is
whether the inclusion of a separate clause naming the press is more than
a redundancy. 5 Are the justifications Brandeis advanced for freedom of
speech equally applicable to freedom of the press? Historical inquiry has
not provided an unequivocal answer. The evidence available indicates that
political writers with whom the Framers were familiar did not distinguish
freedom of speech from freedom of the press.' Records of debates which
preceded adoption of the first amendment are fragmentary and give no
hint as to why the press was referred to in a separate clause.7 Nevertheless,
inferences can be drawn from the circumstances which produced the Bill
of Rights. The men who drafted it were certainly aware of the political uses
of language, and the lawyers among them presumably understood the nice-
ties of legal drafting. That such men, meeting with the express purpose of
writing in guarantees designed to assure those who feared the Constitution
did not provide sufficient protection for individual liberties, chose to refer
to freedom of the press in a separate clause suggests a recognition that
freedom of the press represents more than another expression of a general
concept of freedom of expression.'
3. For an expanded discussion of these justifications see Nimmer, The Right to Speak from
Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56
CALIF. L. REV. 935 (1968).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. Arguments in favor of the recognition of a differentiated guarantee of freedom of the
press are found in Nimmer, Introduction- Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does
it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Freedom of
the Press-A Redundancy]; Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Or of the Press].
6. L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 174 (1960).
7. Freedom of the Press-A Redundancy, supra note 5, at 640.
8. James Madison's first version of what became the first amendment makes the distinc-
tion between freedom of the press and freedom of speech much clearer: "The people shall
not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments;
and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable." 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (1789) (remarks of James Madison). The arrangement of the words as
well as their content clearly implies that, while the guarantees of free speech and free press
are intertwined, they are also distinguishable and severable. Moreover, the characterization
of the press as a bulwark of liberty denotes recognition of the importance of the press as an
institution performing a special role within a democratic society.
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Functional differences between free speech and free press can be demon-
strated by applying Justice Brandeis' justifications for free speech to both
concepts., It is immediately apparent that freedom of the press is equally
important to the maintenance of a democratic dialogue. First amendment
opinions involving the press are replete with ritualistic invocations of the
principle that a free press is an essential component of American democ-
racy.'0 On the other hand, while the press may provide a medium for self-
expression, or serve as a safety valve for those who wish to publicize dis-
sent," these rationales do not appear to be particularly relevant to the
press as an institution.
The differences between free speech and free press are also brought into
relief by those cases where the two are in conflict. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee'" and Miami Herald Pub-
9. See Freedom of the Press-A Redundancy, supra note 5, at 653-54.
10. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (per curiam);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964); Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 719-20 (1931).
11. The prison visitation cases, Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) and Saxbe v. Wash-
ington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974), illustrate the safety valve and self-fulfillment functions.
The cases involved challenges by journalists to state and federal regulations restricting press-
prisoner interviews. Both press and prisoners sought the same result-greater press access to
prisoners and, consequently, greater publicity for the prisoners' point of view. While both
sought the same end, the prisoners were also interested in increased opportunities to express
themselves and to voice their complaints. In other words, separate speech and press interests
happened to coincide in favor of the same goal.
For more on the right of the press to have access to sources of information see Note, The
Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1505 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Rights of Public and Press]; Comment, The Right of the Press to Gather
Information after Branzburg and Pell, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 166 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
After Branzburg].
12. 412 U.S. 94 (1973). It should be pointed out that the Supreme Court has consistently
tended to view the broadcast media as a special case:
The power of a privately owned newspaper to advance its own political, social and
economic views is bounded by only two factors: first, the acceptance of a sufficient
number of readers-and hence advertisers-to assure financial success; and, second,
the journalistic integrity of its editors and publishers. A broadcast licensee has a large
measure of journalistic freedom but not as large as that exercised by a newspaper. A
licensee must balance what it might prefer to do as a private entrepreneur with what
it is required to do as a public trustee.
Id. at 117-18. See also The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARv. L. REv. 56, 178 (1973).
The basic assumption is that since there is only a limited number of broadcast frequencies,
the air waves should be considered part of the public domain. To avoid chaos it is necessary
that the government step in and guarantee that use of this limited resource be apportioned
fairly. However, this raises a very complex set of problems. The government's power to license
access to the air waves must not be allowed to function as a device for censoring what is
broadcast. At the same time, the agency charged with regulating broadcasting must not be
1976]
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lishing Co. v. Tornillo'3 are two examples. In the former, the Court upheld
an FCC ruling that refusals by broadcasters to sell time for editorial adver-
tisements did not violate either the Communications Act" or the first
amendment. Tornillo involved a "right of reply" statute making it a mis-
demeanor for a newspaper to refuse equal space to political candidates who
had been the subject of editorial criticism and affording such candidates
a private cause of action for injunctive relief and damages. The statute was
held to violate the first amendment guarantee of a free press. In both cases,
the claims of those asserting that freedom of speech embraces a right of
access to the press'5 conflicted with the view that freedom of the press
requires freedom from interference with editorial decisions. The Court's
judgment that implementation and enforcement of a right of access would
involve a constitutionally unacceptable degree of governmental interfer-
ence with editorial freedom 6 contained at least an implied recognition of
institutional press rights which are different from and may even conflict
with the right of free speech. 7
rendered inflexible by rigid and simplistic constitutional standards. Achievement of these
goals necessarily involves very complex problems. For a discussion of the history and theory
of public regulation of the air waves see Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. Democratic
National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 100-21 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 375-86 (1969). See also Interview with Chief Justice Burger by Burnett F. Anderson in
61 A.B.A.J. 1352 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Burger Interview].
Nevertheless, despite the special first amendment problems which pertain to the broadcast
media, there is no fundamental difference between electronic and print media. As used here,
the term "press" includes a newspaper entitled to second class mailing privileges; a magazine
or periodical of general distribution; a national or international news service; a radio or
television network or station. This is the definition adopted by the Bureau of Prisons and
cited by Justice Powell in his dissent in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850
(1974).
13. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
14. 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. (Supp. 1976).
15. In the Tornillo case, the appellees argued that decreased competition and increased
consolidation had resulted in the emergence of vast, unresponsive media empires which could
manipulate public opinion at will. Moreover, the same economic factors which had led to the
decrease in the number of media outlets virtually prohibited the entry of new competitors
into the media market. The only way to insure that the public would not be deprived of open
and uninhibited discussion of important issues would be for the government to take affirma-
tive action to force the press to fulfill its obligation to provide a forum for diverse points of
view. 418 U.S. at 248-54.
16. Id. at 256-58; Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,
412 U.S. at 126-31.
17. A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment and
advertising. The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as
to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and
public officials-whether fair or unfair-constitute the exercise of editorial control and
judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial
[Vol. 11:177
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The gradual emergence of a distinct congeries of rights derived from the
general guarantee of a free press is also apparent in decisions which have
accorded protection to activities essential to the operation of press organi-
zations.'8 For example, the Supreme Court has recognized the rights to
publish anonymously'9 and without prior restraint,'2 and to circulate2' or
individually distribute" printed matter. The rule that public figures can-
not recover from a publisher for libel without a showing that untruths
harmful to the plaintiff were maliciously printed 23 is designed to insulate
editorial decision making from the possible chilling effect of the laws of
defamation. In what is potentially the most significant development of all,
the Court has tentatively recognized a right of the press to gather informa-
tion.24 A unifying factor in all these cases is the Court's perception that
interference with the business of the press is no less pernicious than the
direct imposition of controls upon the content of what is published.
Another development with a significant bearing on freedom of the press
is contained in the line of cases in which the Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged that the first amendment protects the right to receive information. 2
The Court first hinted at the existence of this right in Grosjean v. American
Press Co.,21 but stated the proposition more directly seven years later when
it invalidated an ordinance prohibiting the door-to-door distribution of
process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press
as they have evolved to this time.
418 U.S. at 258.
If the Court did not view its decision in terms of a choice of press over speech, it did appear
to accept the proposition that editorial independence is a component of freedom of the press.
18. Freedom of the press in general was applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
19. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
20. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697 (1931).
21. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
22. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
"(1943); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
23. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
24. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681, 707 (1972). Justice Powell made a fleeting
reference to a constitutional right to gather news in his concurring opinion, id. at 709, but
the most serious treatment of such a right occurred in the dissents. Id. at 720-24 (Douglas,
J., dissenting) and id. at 727-28 (Stewart, J., dissenting). For an extensive discussion of the
right to gather information see After Branzburg, supra note 11, and Rights of Public and
Press, supra note 11.
25. See Board of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976), and
cases cited therein, at 1823.
26. 297 U.S. 233, 243, 247 (1936). The Court stated that the public had a right to be
informed fully on public issues.
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handbills because, in addition to abridging free speech and free press, it
interfered with the rights of those willing to accept the appellant's leaf-
lets. 7 The Court has also recognized a right to receive political literature
from abroad,28 the rights of the addressees of prisoners' mail to receive
uncensored letters29 and the right of academics to hear the views of foreign
colleagues."0 In a different context, recent decisions have struck down sta-
tutory and administrative restrictions on advertising which conveys infor-
mation of strong interest to both individual consumers and society in gen-
eral."' Finally, the right to receive has been invoked as the basis for uphold-
ing the FCC's "fairness doctrine. 13 2
It has been stated that the purpose of the first amendment is to assure
"the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and anta-
gonistic sources . . . .- The'amendment is intended "... to main-
tain the opportunity for free political discussion, [so] . . .changes, if
desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. '34 The underlying assump-
tion is that democratic government requires the widespread availability of
information on all subjects of public interest. The right to receive is there-
fore essential, for without protected listeners, speakers, even if their own
expressions are protected, can be denied an audience, and the democratic
dialogue will cease. Furthermore, a right to receive implies a right to ac-
quire information, since it can only be exercised by those who act affirma-
27. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148-49 (1943). See generally Comment, The
Right to Receive and the Commercial Speech Doctrine: New Constitutional Considerations,
63 GEO. L.J. 775 (1975).
28. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
29. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974).
30. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). While holding that it would not look
behind an exercise of the executive's delegated power to exclude aliens where the Government
had a bona fide reason for deciding not to admit someone, the Court was at great pains to
stress that its decision in no way denigrated the plaintiffs' right to hear the views of foreign
academics. In effect, the Court made it clear that it was not basing its decision on first
amendment grounds but, rather, on its traditional policy of deference to Congress and the
executive in immigration matters. Id. at 762-65.
31. Board of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976) (ban on
advertising of prescription drug prices invalid in that it keeps public ignorant of information
of general interest); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (statute making it a misde-
meanor to encourage the procuring of an abortion by sale or circulation of any publication
interfered with first amendment rights where advertisement conveyed information of general
interest and value).
32. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The "fairness doctrine" re-
quires broadcasters to provide equal opportunities for the use of their facilities to the repre-
sentatives of differing points of view on issues of public importance. See Barrow, The Fairness
Doctrine: A Double Standard for Electronic and Print Media, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 659 (1975).
33. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
34. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
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tively to place themselves in a position to obtain the desired information.3 5
Viewed in this perspective, restrictions on the press, which serves as the
primary gatherer and disseminator of information about public issues,
constitute interference with the public's right to receive.3 1
In effect, recognition of the right to receive is a basis upon which to
construct a concept of freedom of the press differentiated from freedom of
speech. This concept rests on two premises. First, the purpose of the first
amendment is served by protection of the right to receive as well as free
speech.3 7 Second, since it is the predominant collector and disseminator of
information on issues of general interest, the press is an essential means
through which citizens exercise their right to receive. Thus, the press serves
a specialized function, and, in the process of serving that function, pro-
motes ends contemplated by the first amendment. It is because the press
is so important to the individual citizen's exercise of first amendment
rights that freedom of the press means more than just freedom of expres-
sion for publishers or broadcasters. It is, in essence, a structural provision
of the Constitution . 3  As everyone, the press is guaranteed freedom of
speech, but it derives rights peculiar to it from its institutional role. In its
reportorial capacity, it serves as a forum for public debate and, in its
editorial capacity, as a contributor to debate. 9 In sum, when the press
35. See Rights of Public and Press, supra note 11, at 1505-06.
36. The role of the press as the representative of the public charged with the acquisition
of information which is to be relayed back to those unable to acquire it for themselves has
been recognized in a variety of contexts. For example, the press has been admitted to trials
closed to the general public. See United States ex rel. Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1008 (1966); Lancaster v. United States, 293 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir.
1961) (per curiam). With varying degrees of certainty, some courts have suggested that the
press enjoys a right of special access to news sources. See, e.g., Schnell v. Chicago, 407 F.2d
1084 (7th Cir. 1969); Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 918
(1959); Trimble v. Johnston, 173 F. Supp. 651 (D.D.C. 1959). In addition, State Department
regulations provide for granting reporters special permission to travel to otherwise restricted
areas for the purposes of gathering information which will be made available to the public.
22 C.F.R. § 51.73 (1975). It has also been argued that allowing the press into urban areas
which have been sealed off to contain civil disturbances is beneficial in that the press can
report on official excesses, ascertain the truth or falsehood of rumors and provide an alterna-
tive means for rioters to express their grievances. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADvIsORY
COMMISSION ON CiviL DISORDER 362 (Bantam ed. 1968). For a general discussion of whether
the press should be accorded a right of special access to news sources see Comment, Has
Branzburg Buried the Underground Press?, 8 HARv. CIV. RIorrs - Civ. Lie. L. REv. 181, 184-
85, 191-93 (1973).
37. As the Supreme Court stated in Board of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1823 (1976), "the protection afforded is to the communication, to its
source and to its recipients both."
38. See Or of the Press, supra note 5, at 633.
39. The Supreme Court appeared to reject the view that the press enjoys special rights
1976]
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engages in activities essential to its civic functions, those activities, insofar
as they are protected, receive this protection by virtue of the specific guar-
antee of the press clause and not from a vague, generalized right of free
speech.
Unfortunately, the conclusion that the Supreme Court is systematically
developing a differentiated concept of freedom of the press is not justified
by a survey of the case law. A number of the decisions treat free speech
and free press under the general rubric of freedom of expression and
thereby fail to draw important distinctions.4" Nevertheless, the Court has
held that certain activities necessary to the function of an independent
press are protected by the first amendment.4 ' Moreover, the Court has
repeatedly emphasized that the essential purpose of the first amendment
is to maintain the free flow of information about matters of public
concern. 2 The remaining question is whether these perceptions, together
with a recognition that the press is an indispensable feature of the political
system contemplated by the first amendment,43 will be translated into a
concept of institutional press rights.
I. "GAG" ORDERS, PRIVILEGES AND LIBELS
A. "Gag" Orders
The trial and conviction that resulted from the infamous Lindbergh
kidnapping" demonstrated in spectacular, if unsettling fashion, how elec-
under the first amendment when it declared that "the First Amendment does not guarantee
the press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public
generally." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972). However, the Court was dealing
within the limited context of a newsman's assertion of a privilege not to reveal confidential
sources balanced against the need of a grand jury conducting an investigation of criminal
activity to develop fully the evidence. Moreover, by equating the press' right.of access with a
public right of access, the Court seems to have defined one unknown in terms of another.
Rights of Public and Press, supra note 11, at 1507. But see Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,
834 (1974), where the Court states that there is no constitutional authority for the proposition
that there is an affirmative duty to make available to journalists sources of information not
available to members of the public generally.
40. This issue is discussed in Freedom of the Press - A Redundancy, supra note 5, at 641-
44, 647-50, 655, 658 and After Branzburg, supra note 11, at 173-76. See also Note, The Right
of the Press to Gather Information, 71 COLUM. L. Rav. 838, 840-43 (1971).
41. See cases cited in notes 19-24 supra.
42. See note 10 supra.
43. Chief Justice Burger has referred to the media as a fourth branch of government in a
de facto sense. Burger Interview, supra note 12, at 1352. Justice Stewart has espoused the
view that the press clause establishes the press as a constitutionally protected institution, a
de jure fourth estate. Or of the Press, supra note 5, at 633-37.
44. The conviction of the defendant was affirmed in 115 N.J.L. 412, 180 A. 809, cert.
[Vol. 11: 177
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tronic communications could generate an atmosphere of public excitement
fatal to the orderly conduct of a criminal proceeding. Again, in the 1960's
the growth of political and social turbulence accompanied by the establish-
ment and consolidation of nationwide television networks capable of in-
stantaneously focusing public attention on a given subject or event revived
worries about insulating the courts from disruptive publicity.45 The Su-
preme Court's holding in Sheppard v. Maxwell,"6 that the massive, perva-
sive and prejudicial publicity attending the petitioner's prosecution for the
murder of his wife4" had denied him a fair trial consistent with due process
spawned renewed efforts to reach an accommodation between the rights
to a fair trial and the rights of a free press."8
The issues posed by Sheppard were not new to the Supreme Court. As
early as 1878, the Court held in Reynolds v. United States9 that the finding
by a trial court that the jury's impartiality had not been affected by
pretrial publicity could not be set aside on review in the absence of mani-
fest error. Sounding a distinctly modern theme, the Court stated that
expanded communications and universal literacy made the search for ju-
rors totally unfamiliar with a case a hopeless and needless task."0 Similarly,
in Stroble v. California" the Court ruled that the mere fact that inflamma-
denied, 296 U.S. 649 (1935), motion to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus denied, 297
U.S. 693 (1936).
Publicity at the time of the trial was intense. Newspapers had argued the case before
the trial commenced and published the results of street polls reflecting the general consensus
that the defendant was guilty. Some 700 reporters and 130 photographers were present, and
the entire spectacle was captured on sound film by a camera crew. To this day the Lindbergh
kidnapping trial remains the most widely publicized trial ever held in this country.
For an account of the events of the trial see Hallman, Some Object Lessons on Publicity
in Criminal Trials, 24 MINN. L. REv. 453 (1940).
45. See, e.g., Free Press and Fair Trial, Hearings on S. 290 Select Committee on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1965); FREE PREss-FAR TIUAL, REPORT OF THE PROCEED-
INGS OF A CONFERENCE ON PREJUDICIAL NEWS REPORTING IN CRIMINAL CASES (Conducted by
Northwestern School of Law and Medill School of Journalism, Fred E. Inbau, ed., 1962);
Report of the Comm. on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free Press-Fair Trial"
Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391 (1968); Special Commission on Radio Television and the Administration
of Justice of the Assn. of the Bar of the City of New York, Freedom of the Press and Fair
Trial (1967). See also Jaffe, Trial by Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 504 (1965); Powell, The
Right to a Fair Trial, 51 A.B.A.J. 534 (1965).
46. 384 U.S. 333 (1966). The sixth amendment has been made applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
47. There are many striking similarities between the facts of the Sheppard case and the
Lindbergh kidnapping trial.
48. See note 45 supra.
49. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). See also the discussion of the Aaron Burr trial in Nebraska Press
Ass'n. v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 2797-98 (1976).
50. 98 U.S. at 155-56.
51. 343 U.S. 181 (1952). See also Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962).
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tory reports about the case had been published did not necessarily make
it impossible for the defendant to have a fair trial. While the Reynolds rule
that prior knowledge does not inevitably prejudice a juror retains its viabil-
ity,5 the Court has cautioned that the presumption of impartiality does
not preclude inquiry as to whether pretrial publicity has denied the
defendant a trial consistent with due process of law.53 In addition, the
Court has ruled that television coverage of courtroom proceedings is una-
voidably disruptive and, therefore, inherently violative of due process.54 In
effect, the Court's view that a "responsible press has always been regarded
as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration . . .,I contem-
plates the possibility that in certain circumstances courts may be required
to take steps to protect the defendant from irresponsible (prejudicial) press
coverage ."
There are a number of remedies which courts can apply when faced with
the problem of prejudicial publicity . 7 A court can grant a change of
venue,5" allow a continuance while the effects of pretrial publicity dissi-
pate59 or employ careful voir dire examination to discover and exclude
prejudiced jurors."0 All of these can be classified as passive remedies in that
52. See, e.g., Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
53. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961). See also Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466
(1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Marshall v. United Statee, 360 U.S. 310
(1959) (per curiam).
54. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). The Estes ruling was an expansion of the Court's
earlier holding in Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), that televising the defendant in
the act of confessing to a crime was inherently invalid under the due process clause even
without a showing of prejudice or a demonstration of a nexus between the televised confession
and the trial. See 373 U.S. at 729-33 (Clark, J., dissenting).
55. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) (emphasis added).
56. From the cases coming here we note that unfair and prejudicial news comment on
pending trials has become increasingly prevalent. Due process requires that the ac-
cused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences. Given the
pervasiveness of modern communications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial
publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures to
ensure that the balance is never weighed against the accused.
Id. at 362.
57. See generally id: at 357-62; Report of the Comm. on the Operation of the Jury System
on the "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391 (1968).
58. See, e.g., Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
In each case, the failure to move the trial to a jurisdiction at some distance from the scene of
the crime resulted in reversals of convictions.
59. See Hudon, Freedom of the Press versus Fair Trial: The Remedy Lies with the Courts,
1 VAL. U.L. REV. 8, 19-20 (1966).
60. See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975); Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962);
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). The proper or improper use of voir dire was an element
in all of these decisions.
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a court reacts to the fact of publicity by attempting to neutralize its effects.
Active remedies, by which a court acts affirmatively to restrict the flow of
publicity, range from the relatively mild expedient of limiting the number
of reporters allowed in the courtroom' to prohibiting any extrajudicial
statements by any lawyer, party, witness or court official.6 2 The dangers
inherent in the use of such active remedies is illustrated by one of the most
drastic, the court's power to punish for contempt." If exercised without
restraint, that power can become an instrument for the intimidation of
those who report and comment upon legal proceedings. The end result is
the suppression of information of public interest. Consequently, the Su-
preme Court has set strict limits on judicial discretion to issue contempt
citations against those who publish items critical of judges and their ad-
ministration of the legal system."
In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,5 the Supreme Court had its
first opportunity to deal with what it characterized as "one of the most
extraordinary remedies known to our jurisprudence,"6 the "gag" order. 7
The case arose out of events surrounding an arrest and prosecution for the
murder of six members of a single family in Sutherland, Nebraska. The
crime immediately attracted considerable coverage by both local and na-
tional media. After the county court granted the prosecution's motion for
an order prohibiting the press from reporting certain information about the
case, the petitioners applied to the district court for leave to intervene and
began the litigation which culminated in the Supreme Court's ruling.6
61. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966).
62. Id. at 359, 361.
63. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907) (upholding contempt convictions of
publishers of articles and cartoons critical of the Supreme Court of Colorado). See generally
Jaffe, Trial by Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U. L. Rsv. 504, 505 (1965).
64. See Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), in which the Court established the rule that
contempt citations against the authors and publishers of critical commentary directed at the
courts violate freedom of the press when such criticism poses no clear and present danger to
the fair administration of justice. See also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469
(1975), which reiterated the specific holding in Craig, that it is inconsistent with the first and
fourteenth amendments to impose sanctions on the accurate publication of what has taken
place in a public judicial proceeding.
65. 96 S. Ct. 2791 (1976).
66. Id. at 2804.
67. As used here, the term "gag" order, or more properly, closure, refers to those orders
whereby courts prohibit the press from making public certain facts about a case. In the form
it reached the Supreme Court, the order in the Nebraska Press case prohibited reporting the
existence and nature of any of the defendant's confessions to law enforcement officers any
confessions made to any third parties, except members of the press, and any other facts
"strongly implicative" of the accused. Id. at 2796.
68. The litigation which preceded the Supreme Court's hearing of the case was quite
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After first holding that the expiration of the challenged order had not
rendered the case moot,69 the majority opinion"0 discussed the history of the
free press-fair trial controversy. Acknowledging the complexity of the
issues raised, Chief Justice Burger stated that since the function of a court
is not to write codes, it would not attempt to resolve all the problems
involved. Rather, the Court would look to the facts of this particular case
and the legal context in which they arose .
7
The Court began its discussion by examining previous cases in which
pretrial publicity had been a factor. Referring to the trial court's "duty to
protect the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial,"7 the Court
cited with approval the admonition in Sheppard v. MaxwellW3 that, in view
of the pervasiveness of modem communications and the difficulty of effac-
ing prejudicial publicity from the minds of jurors, courts should take strong
measures to preserve the fairness of their proceedings. 4 But the Court also
extensive. The county court's issuance of the original order was followed by petitioners'-
newspapers, broadcasters, journalists, news media associations and wire services - application
to intervene in the district court. Leave was granted, but the district court refused to vacate
the county court's order, choosing instead to issue its own order modifying the original.
Petitioners then asked the district court for a stay and applied to the Supreme Court of
Nebraska for a stay, a writ of mandamus and an expedited appeal. Meanwhile, petitioners
also applied to Justice Blackmun as Circuit Justice for a stay of the district court's order.
He postponed a ruling out of deference to the Nebraska Supreme Court. 423 U.S. 1319
(Blackmun, Circuit Justice, 1975) (in chambers). However, upon concluding that delay was
no longer tolerable, Justice Blackmun entered an order which partially stayed the district
court's order. 423 U.S. 1327 (Blackmun, Circuit Justice, 1975) (in chambers). The Nebraska
Supreme Court issued its opinion shortly thereafter and upheld the order as modified. State
ex rel. Nebraska Press Ass'n. v. Stuart, 194 Neb. 783, 236 N.W.2d 794 (1975). Subsequently,
the full Supreme Court denied petitioner's application for a more extensive stay, 423 U.S.
1027 (1975), and the case on the merits came before the Court in that posture. The history of
the litigation is treated in detail in the case itself. 96 S. Ct. at 2809-14 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring).
69. The Court found that the underlying dispute between the parties was one "capable of
repetition yet evading review," Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911),
in that, if the defendant's conviction was reversed and a new trial ordered, the district court
might enter another order, (since the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision authorized state
prosecutors to seek such orders), and if a new order was entered, it too might expire after a
short period and review wotild be evaded. 96 S. Ct. at 2797.
70. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices White,
Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist, joined. Justices White and Powell filed concurring opin-
ions. Justice Brennan filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Stewart
and Marshall joined. Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
71. 96 S. Ct. at 2799.
72. Id.
73. 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966).
74. 96 S. Ct. at 2799.
75. The cases cited by the Court were Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975); Beck v.
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noted that cases like Sheppard were relatively rare. Other cases'5
demonstrated that ". . . pretrial publicity-even pervasive, adverse pub-
licity-does not inevitably lead to an unfair trial,""6 as long as -the trial
judge took the proper measures to mitigate its effects. Consequently, the
issue was not whether the Nebraska courts had erred in perceiving a threat
to the defendant's rights, "but whether in the circumstances of this case
the means employed were foreclosed by another provision of the Constitu-
tion.""
The heart of the Court's opinion was its discussion of first amendment
principles. Classifying gag orders as prior restraints on speech," it restated
the standard formula that any prior restraint on speech comes before the
court with a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. 9 As the
Court stated, "prior restraints on speech and publication are the most
serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights."8 If
the press is to continue as the "'handmaiden of effective judicial
administration'" and a watchdog guarding against miscarriages of justice,
then "the protection against prior restraint should have particular force as
applied to reporting of criminal proceedings .... '81' Furthermore, while
the extraordinary protection afforded the press by the first amendment
carries with it something in the nature of a fiduciary duty not to exercise
press rights to the detriment of a criminal defendant, recognition of the
danger inherent in even the most well intentioned governmental interfer-
ence should militate against validating any form of prior restraints.8 2 The
Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
76. 96 S. Ct. at 2800.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2802. The classic prior restraint case is Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)
(invalidating a statute authorizing abatement of nuisance suits against periodicals deemed
to regularly publish "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" matter). Recent cases involving
prior restraints include Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (denial
of license to present a musical in a municipal auditorium); Organization for a Better Austin
v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971) (injunction against distribution of leaflets attacking respon-
dent's real estate practices); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968) (injunction against
white supremacist rally); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (commission
established by state legislature exercising informal restraints on distribution of allegedly
obscene literature). A forerunner of the Nebraska Press case was the grant of a stay of an
order restricting media coverage of a rape-murder trial in Louisiana which was entered by
Justice Powell in Times-Picayune Publishing Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 419 U.S. 1301 (Powell,
Circuit Judge, 1974) (in chambers). Another celebrated recent prior restraint case is the
"Pentagon Papers" case. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
80. 96 S. Ct. at 2802.
81. Id. at 2803, quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
82. Id. at 2803, citing Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 259 (1974)
(White, J., concurring).
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Court concluded by refusing to do what the Founders had also not
done-establish a priority between the first and sixth amendments-but
repeated that barriers to prior restraint remain high. 83
Having invoked the doctrine of prior restraint, the Court then examined
the facts to determine whether they justified the imposition of so drastic a
remedy. It first found that, while the trial judge could have reasonably
concluded that publicity might impair the defendant's right to a fair trial,
the conclusion as to the prejudicial effect on jurors was speculative.,4 Sec-
ond, the record failed to disclose whether the Nebraska courts had given
sufficient consideration to less drastic alternatives before concluding that
nothing short of prior restraint would have protected the defendant's
rights. 5 Third, the Court questioned the efficacy of the order in view of the
district court's limited jurisdiction and the probability that in a small town
like Sutherland news and rumors would spread by word of mouth, re-
straints on the press notwithstanding." Finally, evaluating the order as a
whole, the Court ruled that it violated established law by prohibiting the
reporting of what actually occurred in the courtroom 7 and that its ban on
the publication of any "implicative" information was too broad and vague
to withstand scrutiny.8 The opinion concluded with a summary of the
holding:
We reaffirm that the guarantees of freedom of expression are not an absolute
prohibition under all circumstances, but the barriers to prior restraint remain
high and the presumption against its use continues intact. We hold that, with
respect to the order entered in this case prohibiting reporting or commentary
on judicial proceedings held in public, the barriers have not been overcome;
to the extent that this order restrained publication of such material, it is
clearly invalid. To the extent that it prohibited publication based on infor-
mation gained from other sources, . . . the heavy burden imposed as a condi-
tion to securing a prior restraint was not met .... 11
All of the Justices concurred in the judgment, but disagreed as to the
circumstances in which they would uphold a gag order. Justice Brennan
maintained that prior restraints should be held a constitutionally imper-
83. Id. at 2803-04.
84. Id. at 2804.
85. Id. at 2804-05.
86. Id. at 2806.
87. Id. at 2807, citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
88. See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REV. 844
(1970).
89. 96 S. Ct. at 2808.
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missible method of enforcing the right to a fair trial." Justice White won-
dered if, since the Court's ruling made it highly unlikely that any order
restraining the press could ever be justified, it might not have been better
to avoid unnecessary future litigation by simply prohibiting gag orders.9'
On the other hand, Justice Powell stated that in his judgment there were
circumstances which could justify the imposition of prior restraint but
stressed that the party seeking the order bears a unique burden of showing
the necessity for it.2 Justice Stevens stated that, on the whole, he agreed
with Justice Brennan, but that he would prefer to hear more argument
before concluding that restrictive orders are never permissible.93
The majority's reliance on the doctrine of prior restraint meant that the
Court viewed the central issue in terms of a press right of free speech"
rather than in terms of any institutional rights of the press. While referring
to the press as the "'handmaiden of effective judicial administration'"
and acknowledging its role as a guardian against miscarriages of justice, 5
the Court's opinion did not turn on the recognition that restrictive orders
prevent the press from performing its special constitutional functions as
gatherer and disseminator of information.
By contrast, Justice Brennan's concurrence was much more sensitive to
the role of the press in a democratic system:
'[I]n a society in which each individual has but limited time and resources
with which to observe at first hand the operations of his government, he relies
necessarily upon the press to bring him in convenient form the facts of those
operations. . . .Without the information provided by the press most of us
and many of our representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to
register opinions on the administration of government generally."'
Justice Brennan also took account of the public's right to have access to
certain information, particularly where it aided in evaluating the conduct
of those who govern.97 Recognition of judicial authority to impose prior
restraint would interfere with that right because the exercise of such au-
90. Id. at 2809.
91. Id. at 2808.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2830. With Justices Stevens and White apparently leaning towards the position
of Justices Brennan, Stewart and Marshall, there is a potential majority in favor of prohibit-
ing gag orders.
94. The Court refers to prior restraints on speech in a number of instances. See, e.g., id.
at 2801, 2802. In the summary of its holding, the Court refers to prior restraint within the
context of the "freedom to speak and publish," and "freedom of expression." Id. at 2808.
95. Id. at 2803, quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
96. Id. at 2821, quoting Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975).
97. Id. at 2816, 2825.
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thority requires judges to evaluate whether the public interest in receiving
information outweighed the speculative impact its release might have on
a defendant's rights. 8 In effect, judges would be cast in the role of censors,
and an intolerable burden would be placed on first amendment rights, for
"in the context of prior restraints on publication, the decision of what,
when and how to publish is for editors, not judges."9
It is unfortunate that the Nebraska Press case may prove to have settled
nothing.' As Justice White implied, 0' the Court's decision to leave open
the possibility that in some circumstances a gag order could be justified
simply sets the stage for more litigation. It is suggested that a shift from
reliance on prior restraint, essentially a speech doctrine, to a method of
analysis which recognizes specific press rights will provide a basis upon
which to break the current impasse.
B. Newsman's Privilege
The rationale for testimonial privileges is the protection of interests or
relationships which are considered of sufficient social importance to justify
not developing evidence which would be of value to a judicial proceeding.'°0
The general interest fostered by a newsman's privilege not to reveal confi-
dential sources would be the free flow of information, since it would pre-
sumably make persons fearful of exposure to investigation, prosecution or
reprisal more inclined to confide in journalists."3 Information gained in
this manner could then serve as the basis for reports to the public on
important matters which might not otherwise have come to light. In effect,
by enhancing the ability of the press to gather information, recognition of
some form of newsman's privilege would promote the public's interest in
receiving information. 4
98. Id. at 2825.
99. Id. at 2828.
100. For one assessment of the impact of the Nebraska Press decision from the point of
view of the press see Media and Law, 52 NEW YORKER, July 12, 1976, at 26.
101. 96 S. Ct. at 2808.
102. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 72 (2d ed. 1972).
103. For a study of the importance of a guarantee of confidentiality to working reporters
see Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REv. 229 (1971).
104. See generally Beaver, The Newsman's Code, The Claim of Privilege and Everyman's
Right to Evidence, 47 ORE. L. REV. 243 (1968); D'Alemberte, Journalists Under the Axe:
Protection of Confidential Sources of Information, 6 HARV. J. LEIS 307 (1969); Guest &
Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L.
REV. 18 (1969); Nelson, The Newsmen's Privilege Against Disclosure of Confidential Sources
and Information, 24 VAND. L. REV. 667 (1971); Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The
Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317 (1970).
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The issues in Branzburg v. Hayes'5 were whether the first amendment
supported the claim of a reporter who had witnessed a crime that he could
not be required to testify before a grand jury as to what he had seen and
whether he could be compelled to appear before the grand jury in order to
assert the privilege not to testify.' These issues had arisen out of four
separate cases which had been consolidated on appeal to the Supreme
Court.' 7 All involved refusals by reporters either to appear or testify before
grand juries which had subpoenaed them after the publication of stories
in which they had described criminal activity. Each of the petitioners
argued for a qualified privilege to withhold the names of sources and un-
published information gathered in the course of preparing their articles.
There was also general agreement that the government should be required
to make a showing that it had a compelling interest in the information
sought in order to defeat the claim of privilege." 8
The Court faced the issues raised in Branzburg in some disarray. A
plurality of four Justices' 9 supported by the concurring opinion of Justice
Powell held that, in general, newsmen were required to appear before a
grand jury which had subpoenaed them and answer all relevant questions
asked of them during a criminal investigation. On the issue of appearance,
the plurality also rejected the compelling interest standard proposed by
the petitioners."' Three of the dissenters adopted a qualified privilege and
would require that it remain in effect unless the government could show
the relevance of the information sought, its unavailability from alternate
sources and a compelling interest in obtaining it."' Justice Douglas argued
for an absolute privilege."'
105. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
106. Branzburg, a reporter for a Louisville, Kentucky newspaper, had argued that the
privilege should include a right not to appear at secret grand jury proceedings, for his sources
would have no way of verifying whether he had asserted his privilege or revealed confidential
information. See Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege for
Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709, 710 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Developing Qualified
Privilege].
107. The cases are: Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal.), rev'd in part
sub nom, Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970); Branzburg v. Meigs, 503
S.W.2d 748 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971); In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971); Branz-
burg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970).
108. For a summary of the positions taken in the briefs of the petitioners and the amici
curiae see Developing Qualified Privilege, supra note 106, at 714.
109. The plurality opinion was by Justice White, who was joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist without opinion, and by Justice Powell who filed a
concurring opinion.
110. 408 U.S. at 708.
111. Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 712.
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Because of this split, Justice Powell's opinion was the critical one; it is
also the most difficult to analyze."3 It appears that Justice Powell did not
all together reject a qualified privilege: "The Court does not hold that
newsmen, subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, are without constitu-
tional rights with respect to the gathering of news or in safeguarding their
sources.""' However, he refused to extend the privilege to include protec-
tion of a reporter from appearing."' As for limits on the qualified privilege
recognized, Justice Powell would require a showing of relevance by the
state" and would favor protective orders where a reporter established that
the information sought was "without a legitimate need of law enforce-
ment."" 7
Since Justice Powell refused to rule out the recognition of a privilege in
all circumstances, a numerical majority of the Branzburg Court adopted
positions favoring at least a qualified newsman's testimonial privilege.
But, the limits of that privilege are unclear."' Assuming that neither Jus-
113. Justice Stewart's dissent described the Powell opinion as "enigmatic." Id. at 725.
114. Id. at 709.
115. "The newsman witness, like all other witnesses, will have to appear; he will not be in
a position to litigate at the threshold of the State's very authority to subpoena him." Id. at
710 (footnote).
116. Id. at 710. Justice Powell would quash a subpoena if "the newsman is called upon to
give information bearing only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the investi-
gation .... "
117. Id.
118. In Developing Qualified Privilege, supra note 106, at 716-19, it is argued that in the
Branzburg decision a rule supported by the numerical majority can be discerned. It is sug-
gested that the rule is that reporters have a qualified privilege dependent on their showing
that (1) the testimony sought would be irrelevant, (2) it would further no compelling state
interest in that it was not sought for legitimate law enforcement purposes, or (3) that it is
not required by other unspecified forms of balancing such as exhaustion of alternate sources.
This interpretation is arrived at by tailoring Justice Powell's concurrence to fit the elements
of the three part test which the dissent by Justice Stewart proposed the government should
be required to meet in order to defeat a claim of privilege. See note 111, supra and accompa-
nying text. There is, however, an obvious weaknesses in this argument, notably Justice
Powell's complete silence as to the second element in the Stewart test, nevertheless, it is
argued that Justice Powell's opinion is not incompatible with that of the non-absolutist
dissenters.
This analysis appears to be erroneous for several reasons. First, by attempting to fit
Justice Powell's opinion within the structural framework established by the dissent's three-
part test, the analysis stretches the opinion by Justice Powell too far. Second, in the footnote
to his opinion, Justice Powell specifically states that "[tihe new constitutional rule endorsed
by . ..[the] dissenting opinion would, as a practical matter, defeat . . . a fair balancing
and the essential societal interest in the detection and prosecution of crime would be heavily
subordinated." 408 U.S. at 710 (footnote). Thus, while it is true that Justice Powell adopts
a qualified privilege, he seems to go no further. The limits Justice Powell places upon the
privilege do not correspond to those proposed by the dissent. This is so because Justices
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tice Douglas' nor the plurality's absolutist rules will be adopted in the
future, it remains to be seen whether the Court will place the burden of
proof on the party asserting the privilege or on the party seeking to obtain
confidential information.
Recognition of a qualified newsman's privilege is potentially an impor-
tant step in the development of a differentiated concept of freedom of the
press, because it confers upon the press a special right to protect its ability
to acquire information. That the plurality recognized some of the implica-
tions is evidenced by Justice White's admission that denial of the privilege
would place some burden on news gathering,1 9 even if the effect were
speculative. 120 Justice White also wrote that "without some protection for
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated,"'' and
stated in his conclusion that "news gathering is not without its First
Amendment protections . ".1.."2 But the plurality refused to concede
that the special informative function performed by the organized press
entitled it to any special form of protection:'2 "Freedom of the press is a
'fundamental personal right' which 'is not confined to newspapers and
periodicals.' " 4 Reporters, like other citizens, must respond to relevant
questions put to them during a valid grand jury investigation or criminal
trial.'2
Once again it fell to the dissenters to explore how the press fits into the
governmental scheme contemplated by the first amendment. Justice
Douglas maintained that the central purpose of the first amendment is to
preserve the ability of the citizenry to acquire the information it needs in
order to exercise intelligently the right to self-government.2 6 One of the
principles which can be derived from this understanding of the amend-
Stewart's and Powell's opinions begin with different premises. The former proceeds from a
presumption in favor of privileges, and the limits on privilege are structured accordingly; the
latter regards newsmen's interests in confidentiality and society's interests in the detection
and prosecution of crime as equally weighted and will determine which is to prevail on a case
by case basis.
119. 408 U.S. at 680.
120. The Court went to great lengths to discount the practical effect its ruling might have
on newsmen's ability to gather information. Id. at 693-95.
121. Id. at 681.
122. Id. at 707. Some commentators have focused on the Court's lengthy discussion of the
respective rights of the press and the grand jury and have concluded that part of the holding
in Branzburg is that information gathering by the press is entitled to constitutional protec-
tion. See, e.g., After Branzburg, supra note 11, at 178-81.
123. 408 U.S. at 705.
124. Id. at 704, quoting Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450, 452 (1938).
125. Id. at 691-92.
126. Id. at 713-14, quoting Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup.
CT. REv. 245, 254.
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ment is that there can be no self-government "unless the people are im-
mersed in a steady, robust, unimpeded and uncensored flow of opinion and
reporting which are continuously subjected to critique, rebuttal, and re-
examination.' ' 27 The status of the reporter as news gatherer makes him an
integral part of this crucial process.'2 8 Consequently, failure to recognize a
newsman's privilege ultimately weakens the people's ability to govern.'29
While Justice Stewart did not adopt Justice Douglas' absolutist
position, he too insisted that "[t]he reporter's constitutional right to a
confidential relationship with his source stems from the broad societal
interest in a full and free flow of information to the public." ' Moreover,
a right to gather news implies a right of confidentiality, since, in its present
state, the process of news gathering requires the services of informants. 3
The existence of a subpoena power unchecked by a constitutional guaran-
tee of confidentiality would interfere with the operations of the press by
deterring sources from divulging information and reporters from gathering
and publishing it.132 Thus, "valuable information will not be published and
the public dialogue will inevitably be impoverished.' 13
Despite the holding in Branzburg, the Court was not wholly unsympa-
thetic to the special needs of the organized press. The plurality acknowl-
edged that the use of the grand jury as a means for harassment of the press
would violate constitutional prohibitions, 4 and it did not dismiss the con-
tention that compelling reporters to testify to a grand jury could detract
from their ability to gather information.' Perhaps, when the Supreme
Court hears another newsman's privilege case, these perceptions will have
developed to the point of recognizing more fully what Justice Stewart has
termed "the critical role of an independent press in our society.' ' 3
127. Id. at 715.
128. Id.
129. Today's decision will impede the wide-open and robust dissemination of ideas and
counter-thought which a free press both fosters and protects and which is essential to
the success of intelligent self-government.
The press has a preferred position in our constitutional scheme, not to enable it to
make money, not to set newsmen apart as a favored class, but to bring fulfillment to
the public's right to know.
Id. at 720-21.
130. Id. at 725.
131. Id. at 728-29.
132. Id. at 728.
133. Id. at 736.
134. Id. at 707-08.
135. Id. at 693-94.
136. Id. at 725.
[Vol. 11: 177
FREEDOM OF PRESS CASES
C. Libel
Prior to 1964, the publishers of printed materials ran a high risk. Their
defenses were limited to consent, 3 ' truth'38 or a very narrowly defined
privilege.'39 The so-called "public interest" defense recognized by the Re-
statement of the Law of Torts"' applied in only a few situations, and, as
the comments made clear, did not protect those who published "false
defamatory statements of fact about public officers or candidates for of-
fice."' ' In effect, the law of defamation had developed a rule of strict
liability for the publication of false defamatory matter.4 2 On the constitu-
tional level, the Supreme Court had held that libelous statements were not
protected by the guarantees of freedom of speech and press.' But, the
Supreme Court's ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan' altered these
previously settled principles in the law of defamation by introducing addi-
tional safeguards for first amendment freedoms.'45
The specific holding in the Times case was that in a state libel trial a
public official bears the burden of establishing a defendant publisher's
"malice" in order to recover damages for defamatory statements about his
conduct in office.'" Malice was defined as a knowing falsity or reckless
137. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 583 (1938).
138. Id. § 582.
139. Id. § 598.
140. Id.
141. Id. comment a. See also id. comment b. The common law of torts did recognize a
privilege to make "fair comment" on issues of public concern. The privilege applied to
comments on public officials, political candidates, prominent figures in the private sector,
persons who took positions on matters of public interest and those who offered themselves to
the public for approval, namely artists, athletes and actors. The privilege did not apply to
misstatements of fact, and it protected only opinions. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 118, at 819-20 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. The central issue
was whether a statement was a fact or an opinion, a distinction which confused the courts.
See Titus, Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion-A Spurious Dispute in Fair
Comment, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1203 (1962).
142. PROSSER, supra note 141, § 113 at 773.
143. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (dictum); Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952).
144. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For comment on the case see Brennan, The Supreme Court and
the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965); Kalven,
The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964
Sup. CT. REV. 191.
145. Justice Brennan wrote for the Court and was joined by Chief Justice Warren and
Justices Clark, Harlan, Stewart and White. Justices Black and Goldberg filed concurring
opinions, and both were joined by Justice Douglas.
146. 376 U.S. at 283. The "reckless disregard" standard was explained as requiring a "high
degree of awareness of. .. probable falsity" in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731
(1968).
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disregard for the truth. This rule was based on the premise that the tradi-
tional defense of truth did not adequately protect freedom of the press.'
Consequently, the Court adopted the more stringent malice standard and
applied it to the facts of the case. On that basis, the Court determined that
affirmance of the verdict in favor of Sullivan would be to countenance
unacceptable interference with freedom of expression."'
The underlying rationale for the Times decision was the Court's desire
to maintain "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. . . . "' To
that end, it was better to risk some danger of press abuse in order to
eliminate the chilling effect created by the threat of large damage
awards.' Where libel laws operated to promote self-censorship which in-
hibited discussion of public issues, they would have to yield to the consti-
tutional requirement of free and open debate.'
The development of constitutional limitations on the law of defamation
was continued in the decade following the Times decision 2 and may be
summarized as follows:'53 (1) "public officials" must prove "actual mal-
ice," i.e., knowing or reckless falsity, to recover damages for defamatory
falsehoods; (2) "public officials" must also prove knowing or reckless fals-
ity before recovering for defamatory statements respecting their public
involvement; (3) the standard of "actual malice" does not mean "malice"
or "recklessness" as these were defined at common law. It means knowing
or reckless falsity and does not denote motive or intent. Reckless disregard
is established where the evidence permits the conclusion that the defend-
ant in fact had serious doubts as to the truth of the matter published;
147. 376 U.S. at 278-79.
148. Id. at 283-92.
149. Id. at 270.
150. Id. at 279.
151. Id. at 279.
152. There are a dozen cases constituting the progeny of New York Times v. Sullivan:
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401
U.S. 295 (1971); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401
U.S. 265 (1971); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); Pickering
v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Beckley
Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130
(1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965); Garrison
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
153. This summary is taken from Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In
Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEXAS L. REV. 199, 202-04 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Defamation and the First Amendment]. See also Anderson, Libel and Press Self-
Censorship, 53 TEXAS L. REV. 422 (1975); Brosnahan, From Times v. Sullivan to Gertz v.
Welch: Ten Years of Balancing Libel Law and the First Amendment, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 777
(1975).
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and (4) where the utterance involves an issue of public or general concern,
private persons must also prove actual malice. In effect, the decisions
established a specialized definition of malice applicable in defamation
cases and expanded the class of persons against whom the first amendment
privilege provided immunity.
The trend begun in the Times case came to an end in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. 51 In a four-one-four decision,"' the Court restructured the class
of persons to whom constitutional privileges would apply, redefined the
standard of liability and restricted the award of damages.,5 6 Though the
Times "malice" standard was retained for public officials and public fig-
ures,"7 it was scrapped for private plaintiffs. So long as liability was not
imposed without fault, the states were free to set the standard, provided
that the substance of the offending statement made apparent substantial
danger to the private plaintiffs reputation.'58 However, no plaintiff could
recover punitive damages without meeting the Times knowledge of falsity
or reckless disregard for the truth standard. 5'
The modified standards laid down in Gertz were recently applied in
Time, Inc. v. Firestone.' The suit involved had resulted from a report in
Time magazine stating that the respondent's former husband had been
granted a divorce from the respondent on grounds of mental cruelty and
adultery. In fact, though this was not clear from the decree, the divorce
court had made no finding of adultery.' The Supreme Court held that
154. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The case involved an article in a John Birch Society publication
which had accused the plaintiff, a Chicago attorney, of participation in a Communist conspir-
acy to discredit the Chicago police by helping to frame an officer accused of murdering a
youth. These allegations were prompted by Gertz's representation of the boy's family in a
civil action against the officer, who was ultimately convicted of second degree murder. Most
of the article's statements about Gertz were untrue.
155. Justice Powell wrote the plurality opinion and was joined by Justices Stewart, Mar-
shall and Rehnquist. Justice Blackmun concurred specially, stating that he was voting with
the others only to create a majority. 418 U.S. at 354. Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Douglas, Brennan and White each wrote a dissenting opinion.
156. Defamation and the First Amendment, supra note 153, at 212.
157. 418 U.S. at 342.
158. Id. at 347-49.
159. Id. at 349.
160. 96 S. Ct. 958 (1976).
161. The divorce court's final judgment discussed the sensational accusations of adulterous
conduct which both parties had made at some length, id. at 963, but did not specify its reason
for granting the divorce. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida concluded that the divorce
had been granted on the improper ground of lack of domestication, but sustained the divorce
on grounds of extreme cruelty. Id. at 967. This was four years after the original divorce had
been granted and reported. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell pointed out that a
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since the respondent was not a public figure, the rule of the New York
Times case did not apply.' 2 It was also held that the Times rule did not
automatically extend to all reports of judicial proceedings.," However,
while the trial court had found evidence to support an award of compensa-
tory damages, it had not made a finding of fault as required by Gertz.,"
The case was therefore remanded.
Justice Powell has stated that the Gertz rule "sought to shield the press
and broadcast media from a rule of strict liability that could lead to
intolerable self-censorship and at the same time recognize the legitimate
state interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury from
defamatory falsehoods.""' 5 However, the question raised by Gertz is
whether the establishment of a problematical distinction between public
and private plaintiffs does not increase the likelihood of self-censorship by
the press. Given the fact that the concept of a "public figure" is not well
defined,"' there is no guarantee that where one court perceives notoriety
another will find nonentity. For example, how are courts to deal with the
modern phenomenon of the instant celebrity?"7 Does he become a public
reasonably prudent reporter could have been misled by the ambiguity of the divorce court's
opinion into believing that the divorce had been granted on the grounds of adultery. Id. at
972.
162. Id. at 965-66.
163. Id. The Court also refused to apply the rule of Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469 (1975), that a state cannot impose civil liability for the publication of information
accurately obtained from court records on the ground that the information was in reality not
true. In view of the facts discussed in note 161 supra, this is a very technical argument.
164. Id. at 970.
165. Id.
166. In Gertz, the Court stated that designation as a public figure would rest on either of
two alternative bases:
In some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that he
becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts. More commonly, an
individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy
and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues. In either case, such
persons assume special prominence in the resolution of public questions.
418 U.S. at 351.
167. One objection to the pre-Gertz standard has been that it allowed for "bootstrapping"
by the media in that, simply by focusing attention on a given individual, the media could
make him into a public figure. In effect, in the very act of defaming an individual the media
could place him within the class of plaintiffs from whom it is protected by constitutional
privilege. See Defamation and the First Amendment, supra note 153, at 205-08, 220-23. See
also Beytagh, Privacy and a Free Press: A Contemporary Conflict in Values, 20 N.Y.L.F. 453,
467-68 (1975); Frakt, The Evolving Law of Defamation: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan to
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., and Beyond, 6 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 471 (1975). The argument
is not without internal logic. However, given the development of modem communications
technology and its ability to focus public attention on a person or event, it is very difficult to
restrict publicity once a person becomes the object of media attention.
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figure for first amendment purposes? When one considers first, that the
circumstances which produce instant "media heroes" are likely to attend
dramatic, sudden events, and second, that these are precisely the kinds of
situations where the possibility that the press will unintentionally defame
someone is the highest, the answers to these questions are quite important,
since they will establish the standard of liability. By leaving these ques-
tions open, the Court has introduced a new element of uncertainty into
journalistic decision making. It has increased the potential for costly mis-
takes, and the "[flear of guessing wrong must inevitably cause self-
censorship and thus create the danger that the legitimate utterance will
be deterred."'68
Furthermore, Justice Powell's assertion that the Gertz rule would strike
a proper balance between the protection of press freedom and individual
reputations was not borne out by the Firestone case. First, Firestone's
holding that the respondent was not a public figure was questionable. High
society divorces involving allegations of sexual misconduct have always
been the subject of public interest and have been reported by- all types of
news publications. Admittedly, some of the reports emphasize the sensa-
tional and demonstrate little evidence of good taste, but the style of report-
ing should not determine whether it receives constitutional protection.'69
Moreover, while there is admittedly some danger of abuse in allowing the media to decide
in all circumstances who is or is not a public figure, the alternative of having judges second
guess media decisions raises the problem of allowing punishment for the exercise of editorial
freedom.
As for the specific problem of the instant celebrity or media hero, the language of the Gertz
decision is subject to differing interpretations. At one point, the Court stated that designation
as a public figure would occur where an individual was "drawn into a particular public
controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues." 418 U.S. at
351. However, at another point the Court stated that while it was "hypothetically" possible
for someone to become a public figure through no purposeful action of his own, the likelihood
of this happening was "exceedingly rare." The Court went on to state that
[flor the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial prom-
inence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and
influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those
classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public
controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event,
they invite attention and comment.
Id. at 345.
This second formula does not contemplate individuals who are "drawn into" public contro-
versies. Significantly, the second formula was the one cited as the basis for the Firestone
holding that the respondent was not a public figure. 96 S. Ct. at 965.
168. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 50 (1971).
169. 96 S. Ct. at 965. The Court stated that "[d]issolution of a marriage through judicial
proceedings is not the sort of'public controversy' referred to in Gertz, even though the marital
difficulties of extremely wealthy individuals may be of interest to some portion of the reading
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Second, the respondent's classification as a private plaintiff triggered ap-
plication of the Gertz rule that so long as liability was based on some
standard of fault, the plaintiff did not have to make a showing of "malice"
as defined by the New York Times case.'70
The dangers inherent in this restriction of the scope of the Times malice
standard are illustrated by the treatment which the Firestone case had
received in the Florida courts. Two appellate courts dealing with the same
facts and purportedly applying the same negligence standard reached op-
posite conclusions as to Time Magazine's liability.'7 ' When viewed in this
context, the end result of Gertz is not balance but uncertainty. Press
uncertainty as to potential liability for erroneous reporting even in circum-
stances where error was at least plausible, if not inadvertent, 7 does not
seem likely to encourage independent and courageous reporting.
Ill. CONCLUSION: OTHER LIMITING CONSIDERATIONS AND AN ALTERNATIVE
THEORY
The conclusion to be drawn from recent first amendment decisions is
that at present a majority of the Supreme Court remains committed to the
methodology of balancing individual and social interests in freedom of
expression against competing interests which seek to place restrictions on
expression.13 While the Court acknowledges the important role the organ-
ized press plays in a democratic society, this is not a basis for recognizing
public." This appears to be more of a value judgment than a statement of law. Assuming
there is a legitimate purpose served by libel law, it is not as a means for the imposition of
judicial tastes as to what constitutes a suitably dignified subject for public discussion. Cer-
tainly, the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press should not be dependent on
whether the subject reported is a political debate or a marital squabble.
It should also be noted that the respondent, Mrs. Firestone, was not uninterested in the
fact that she was the object of press attention. She was a subscriber to a press clipping service
and she held press conferences during the course of the divorce proceedings. Id. at 980.
(Marshall, J., dissenting). This latter fact would seem to place her within the class of persons
who "have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies .... " Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
170. 418 U.S. at 347-49. States "may define for themselves the appropriate standard of
liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehoods injurious to a private individ-
ual." Id. at 347.
171. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 254 So. 2d 386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (publisher not neg-
ligent); Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1972) (publisher was clearly and convinc-
ingly negligent).
172. In his concurring opinion in Firestone, Justice Powell himself stated that "there was
substantial evidence supportive of Time's defense that it was not guilty of actionable neglig-
ence." 96 S. Ct at 973 (emphasis in original).
173. See generally, Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
L.J. 877 (1963); Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962).
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any special rights which the press derives from that role. Rather, within
the Court's present scheme of analysis, freedom of the press is treated as
freedom of speech exercised by the press. 7 4 Consequently, a claim by the
press that it is asserting a right protected by the first amendment will be
balanced against the competing interests apparent in the particular set of
circumstances which gave rise to the claim. Freedom of expression is, in
essence, limited to the extent that no protection is afforded this constitu-
tional right when its exercise intrudes too deeply upon other rights.
Coming to grips with a balancing approach presents special problems in
that the factors placed on one side of the scale or the other are not always
readily discernible. The broad issue in a defamation case might be whether
or not the general social interest in a free press should outweigh the state's
interest in affording individuals compensation for injury to their
reputations, but this process necessarily involves a number of hidden fac-
tors. A court might not be as solicitous of freedom of the press where the
defendant is a tabloid and not a highly regarded metropolitan daily. The
opprobrium which attaches to a particular kind of defamatory statement
may vary. By its very nature as a process whereby constitutional interests
are weighed in light of the facts, interest balancing allows for evaluations
based on the personal preferences and opinions of the balancer. This does
not mean that judges cannot honestly balance interests, but it must be
acknowledged that they do not do so in a vacuum. Therefore, when a
particular result is the product of interest balancing, the key to under-
standing that result may sometimes lie beneath the stated reasons.
There are some indications that one of the factors which the Court has
taken into account when balancing freedom of the press against other
interests is a concern with the harm which could result from an irresponsi-
ble exercise of press power.175 For example, some traces of this concern may
be present in the Court's explanation that the differentiation between
public and private plaintiffs in defamation cases is predicated on the for-
mer's more ready access to the media to deny defamatory allegations.' 6 In
174. See, e.g., material cited in note 40 supra. In discussing the conflicting interests in
the Gertz case, the Court stated that" 'some antithesis between freedom of speech and press
and libel actions persists, for libel remains premised on the content of speech and limits the
freedom of the publisher to express certain sentiments ... '" 418 U.S. at 342, quoting Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 152 (1967).
175. See generally Anderson, A Response to Professor Robertson: The Issue Is Control of
Press Power, 54 TEXAs L. REv. 271 (1976); Shapo, Media Injuries to Personality: An Essay
on Legal Regulation of Public Communication, 46 TEXAs L. REV. 650 (1968).
176. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, (1974).
Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the
channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to
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another context, the Court has commented on the fiduciary responsibilities
which attended the exercise of first amendment rights by the press.' 77 It is
also interesting to note that one of the foremost proponents of a balancing
approach to first amendment issues, the late Justice Frankfurter,'7 8 was
also very concerned with the dangers posed by an abusive press.' 79 In
Pennekamp v. Florida'0 he made very strong statements against granting
the press excessive privileges and in another case, concluded his opinion
by warning that the Court had "not yet decided that, while convictions
must be reversed and miscarriages of justice result because the minds of
jurors or potential jurors were poisoned, the poisoner is constitutionally
protected in plying his trade."' 8'
counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy. Private individu-
als are therefore more vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting them
is correspondingly greater.
[T]he communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that public offi-
cials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury
from defamatory falsehood concerning them. No such assumption is justified with
respect to a private individual. . . .Thus, private individuals are not only more vul-
nerable to injury than public officials and public figures; they are also more deserving
of recovery.
Id. at 344-45 (footnote omitted).
177. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 2791 (1976).
The extraordinary protections afforded by the First Amendment carry with them
something in the nature of a fiduciary duty to exercise the protected rights responsi-
bly-a duty widely acknowledged but not always observed by editors and publishers.
It is not asking too much to suggest that those who exercise First Amendment rights
in newspapers or broadcasting enterprises direct some effort to protect the rights of an
accused to a fair trial by unbiased jurors.
Id. at 2803.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan noted that even if the press could not be en-
joined from reporting certain information, no matter how shabby the means by which it was
obtained, the press was still subject to civil liability under the libel laws or for invasion of
privacy. Id. at 2816 n.25. Moreover Justice Stevens withheld his complete agreement with
Justice Brennan's concurrence because he was not yet ready to grant the press absolute
protection "no matter how serious an intrusion on privacy might be involved, no matter how
demonstrably false the information might be, no matter how prejudicial it might be to the
interests of innocent persons, and no matter how perverse the motivation for publishing it
." Id. at 2830.
178. A classic formulation of the balancing doctrine is contained in Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-25 (1951).
179. See generally Haimbaugh, Free Press Versus Fair Trial: The Contribution of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, 26 U. PiTr. L. REv. 491 (1965).
180. 328 U.S. 331, 355-57, 364-69 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also Frank-
furter's dissenting opinions in Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 198 (1952); Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252, 279 (1941).
181. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 730 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Perhaps it is reading too much into scattered statements in recent deci-
sions to perceive a continuation of Justice Frankfurter's concern with press
power as an element in the balancing process employed by the current
Court. But, given the difficulties in isolating all the factors which are
weighed when balancing methodology is applied, it cannot be discounted.
Moreover, a Court which favors balancing is likely to be sympathetic to a
viewpoint which supports the proposition that all power should be subject
to some restraint. Finally, a concern with checking unrestrained media
power would be a logical basis upon which to restrict recognition of a
special group of rights belonging to the press as an institution.
An alternative to interest balancing upon which to base a concept of
freedom of the press differentiated from freedom of speech is to define the
purposes of the first amendment and then to extend constitutional protec-
tion to those activities or expressions which further that purpose. This was
the approach taken by the philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn,8 2 and his
theories will be used here as the basis for an alternative mode of dealing
with the press clause of the first amendment.
Briefly stated, Meiklejohn's belief was that the Constitution established
a system of self-government which the first amendment promotes by pro-
tecting the free exchange of ideas."' 3 Therefore, the first amendment does
not protect a freedom to speak, but rather those activities of communica-
tion and thought by which we govern.8 4 The people exercise the power of
self-government through the vote. This means that the quality of govern-
ment is dependent upon the "intelligence, integrity, sensitivity and gener-
ous devotion to the general welfare" which each voter acquires.,"3 It follows
from this that the first amendment protects all those activities which are
involved in the process of self-government. These activities include speech,
press, assembly, petition and the vote. It also protects the "many forms of
thought and expression within the range of human communications from
which the voter derives the knowledge, intelligence, sensitivity to human
values: the capacity for sane and objective judgment which, so far as
possible, a ballot should express."'86 Activities from which the voter derives
knowledge, intelligence, sensitivity and a capacity for sane and objective
judgment include education, the achievements of philosophy and science,
literature and the arts, public discussion of public issues together with the
182. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
183. Id. at 93-94.
184. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 255.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 256.
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spreading of information and opinion bearing on those issues.'87 Conse-
quently, these too are protected by the first amendment.
Taking Meiklejohn's theory of the first amendment as its first premise,
the alternative theory proposed here would go on to derive a distinct group
of press rights from the recognition that, as the predominant gatherer and
disseminator of information, the press is an indispensable means through
which the people acquire the information essential to enlightened self-
government. This recognition of the functional importance of the press in
a democratic society would have two consequences. First, as to the content
of press reports, any report which contained information somehow contri-
butive to the capability for self-government would be protected by the first
amendment. For example, a report on a candidate's financial affairs would
obviously be protected since it provides a basis for evaluating his fitness
for office. A report on his sexual affairs might be less edifying, but could
also be protected as having some bearing on the candidate's fitness for
office. The main point is that the category of information somehow contri-
butive to the capability for self-government should be a broad one.
The second consequence relates to the institutional viability of the press.
It would extend first amendment protection to any activity which the press
must pursue in order to continue serving the public's need for information
which enhances its ability to govern. For example, the right to circulate
would fall within this category of protected activities. So also would the
right to gather information and the right to editorial independence. The
latter would be interpreted broadly so as to exclude the press from liability
under the libel laws. The paramount interest would be preservation of an
independent uninhibited press.
It must be conceded that adoption of a definite or absolutist approach
will not eliminate the need to balance.' 8 The choice of what is to be
included within the category of information which contributes to the ca-
pacity for self-government will inevitably involve some form of balancing.
There are also dangers inherent in granting any institution, whether it be
press or government, a license to exercise great power. A system which
187. See Note, The Speech and Press Clause of the First Amendment As Ordinary
Language, 87 HARv. L. REv. 374 (1973). Meiklejohn's view has been interpreted as establish-
ing a strict dichotomy between discussion of public and private issues. This has been attacked
on the ground that there are public aspects to nearly every issue and that the distinction is
therefore a dubious one. Id. at 380-81. A better view would seem to be that Meiklejohn
realized that almost all issues are tinged with public interest, and, rather than seeking to
establish a dichotomy, sought to establish the broadest possible area of constitutionally
protected expression.
188. Id. at 380-81.
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recognizes that the press has rights as an institution is taking a risk. It is
opening itself up to the possibility that an arrogant, unrestrained and
abusive press may cause it severe harm. However, an approach to first
amendment issues which grants rights to the press because its freedom is
essential to a governmental scheme which relies on the free flow of informa-
tion is ultimately more attuned to the essential principles upon which this
country was founded.
Andrew A. Jaxa-Debicki

